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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
In 2013, the final member states lifted the remaining barriers to competition in the
European postal markets. After decades of postal monopolies, the European Union now
has a fully liberalised postal market. However, the outcome of the liberalisation process
is far from satisfactory. As the latest report on ‘Main Developments in the Postal Sector
(2010-2013)’ shows, former monopolists are increasingly under pressure due to
declining letter volumes while the new competitors struggle to get a hold in the letter
markets. Only in a few countries have the new market entrants in letter markets gained a
significant market share. While letter volumes are falling, the volume of express mail
and parcel services is growing, but here a few global players dominate the international
market.
Supporters of the liberalisation, including the European Commission, have promised
better services at lower prices in a liberalised postal sector. This is hardly the case.
Instead, the liberalisation of European postal markets has resulted in an increasingly
complex and persistently changing market with different providers pursuing different
business strategies. In the letter market, former monopolists have invested heavily in
technological innovation in the areas of sorting and delivery infrastructures while at the
same time closing down post offices and outsourcing the respective services to local
stores or other businesses. The new competitors do not even bother creating country-
wide infrastructures and instead focus on large business customers whose mail can be
picked up at the company premises and delivered in highly populated areas two or three
times a week by a highly flexible workforce. This has put increasing pressure on the
former monopolists, who as universal service providers are required to maintain a
country-wide network. However, it is important to note that the same former
monopolists who are complaining about unfair competition and cream skimming are
pursuing the same strategy with their own foreign subsidiaries. In the express mail and
parcel industry, the main business model is based on the creation of global delivery
chains in which the dominant corporations provide a common infrastructure and (air)
transport between different logistic centres, while most of the delivery is actually done
by independent subcontractors.
While the effect of the various strategies on the quality and efficiency of postal services
is debatable – depending on the operator and the price, some mail arrives faster than
before liberalisation while other mail takes longer to be delivered – the consequences
for employment and working conditions are rather clear. For postal-sector workers, the
changes have been overwhelmingly negative. Liberalisation, together with technological
innovations, has led to a reduction in staff levels, an increase of atypical employment
and a deterioration of pay and working conditions. The combination of low wages and
low employment security means that an increasing percentage of postal-sector work
qualifies as precarious employment. The following paragraphs summarise the main
effects on employment and working conditions.
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Employment numbers: In 2002, the European Commission predicted that the
liberalisation of postal markets would result in net job gains. This is clearly not the case.
In the 2010-13 report on ‘Main Developments in the Postal Sector’, the authors note a
slight drop of jobs numbers during the last decade. Even though there is a lack of
consistent data covering the entire postal-service sector for the period of liberalisation,
available information suggests that this is a gross underestimation. With very few
exceptions (Slovenia, Luxembourg and Iceland), former monopolists have cut back
employment since 1998. In some cases, the job cuts amount to as much as 40% to 50%,
typically they account for between 20% and 30%. Contrary to the Commission’s
expectations, these job cuts were not offset by the resulting growth in employment
among new market entrants – not even in the few countries where the new competitors
have acquired market shares of more than 10%.
In the Netherlands, 34,000 near-full-time jobs lost at Dutch Post compare to 22,000
part-time jobs created by the new competitors. In Germany, the former monopolist has
cut 38,000 mostly full-time jobs in the letter market since 1999, while the new market
entrants have created 16,308 full-time equivalent employment opportunities. In Sweden,
1,740 full-time equivalent jobs created by the new competitors compare to 12,000 jobs
eliminated at Swedish Post between 1998 and 2008. In Spain, 4,000 job losses at the
former monopolist are offset by an equal number of jobs created by the new
competitors. However, most of the newly created jobs are part-time. As described
below, new competitors use part-time jobs as part of their flexible low-cost business
strategy.
This analysis is based on data from company reports. Unfortunately, Eurostat does not
provide consistent data for the entire liberalisation period. However, according to data
from the European Labour Force Survey (which needs to be treated with caution due to
a change in the classification system), employment in postal and courier activities (in
the 18 countries for which data is available) fell by 85,000 jobs or 5% of employment
between 2003 and 2012. Longer-term data from national sources for Austria, Belgium,
Germany and Sweden found an even lager drop in employment.
Forms of employment: Liberalisation has not only resulted in a decline in
employment, but also in a far-reaching deterioration of employment relations. What the
authors of ‘Main Developments in the Postal Sector (2010-2013)’ describe as a
flexibilisation of employment relations is actually a substantial increase in atypical
forms of employment and a far-reaching precarisation of postal-sector work. The main
forms of atypical employment include part-time work, self-employment and temporary
contracts.
Part-time work: Most former monopolists have increased the number of part-time
workers since the start of the liberalisation process. However, some incumbents,
including Dutch Post, have shifted to a mail delivery model that almost exclusively
relies on with part-time staff. 85% of the workforce at Dutch Post is employed on part-
time contracts. In Cyprus and Lithuania, nearly 60% of the workers employed at the
former monopolists work part-time and in Latvia and Luxembourg about 40%. In the
Dutch case, the shift to part-time was part of a reorganisation of the delivery system and
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a shortening of delivery routes. However, part-time is even more widespread among the
new competitors. In Germany and Spain, the new market entrants mainly operate with
part-time staff, who often work in less than half-time jobs. In Germany less than 20% of
the workforce at the new competitors are employed on full-time contracts. Almost 25%
work normal part-time, whereas a majority of almost 60% work very short part-time, or
what in Germany is called ‘mini jobs’ (jobs that pay less than 400 euro per month). In
the Netherlands, workers at the new market entrants also work for just a few hours per
week but they do not count as part-time workers as until recently they were mainly self-
employed.
Self-employment: While in some countries the new competitors mainly rely on part-time
staff, in others they predominantly deploy self-employed postal deliverers. In both
cases, the use of atypical employment is part of the competitors’ low-cost strategy. As
mentioned before, in the Netherlands the vast majority of mail deliverers at the new
competitors were self-employed until government regulations forced the companies to
transform at least 80% of the contracts into regular employment relationships. In
Austria, too, new market entrants almost exclusively operate with self-employed mail
deliverers, whereas in Poland self-employed workers account for slightly more than
50% of the new competitors’ workforce. As described below, self-employed deliverers
not only suffer from a lack of employment protection and social security, but are also
paid extremely low, piece-rate-based wages.
Self-employment is particular widespread in the parcel and express service industry.
Even though there is a lack of country-wide data, case studies suggest that a large part
of the delivery activities are carried out by self-employed drivers paid by piece rates.
Here self-employment is the result of an outsourcing chain in which the global players,
and increasingly also the former monopolists, contract so-called service partners for
delivery activities who, in turn, hire self-employed drivers to carry out the delivery
tasks. In 2010, 85% of the parcels sent through Dutch Post were delivered by
subcontractors.
Temporary work: Some former monopolists also use temporary employment. Malta
stands out as 32% of the workforce of the country’s former monopolist are employed on
a temporary basis. While Malta is an outlier, in Estonia the proportion is still 21%, in
Greece 18%, in Poland and Ireland 14%, in the Czech Republic 13%, in Finland 12%
and in Portugal 9%. While former monopolists argue that they need temporary workers
to cope with peaks in letter and parcel volumes, Polish Post offers temporary contracts
to many newly hired workers before management decides to hire them on a permanent
basis.
Wages: Liberalisation has put increasing pressure on postal-sector wages and in many
cases resulted in a reduction of wage levels. Information from a number of selected
countries shows that former monopolists have either reduced wages for workers that
were hired after a certain date in the liberalisation process (in Germany minus 30% after
2001, in Austria minus 25% after 2008) while in others wage cuts were the result of the
introduction of new job categories, such as assistant or auxiliary mail deliverers (in the
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Netherlands minus 40%, in Belgium minus 5%). In Greece, a 35% wage cut for workers
employed by Greek Post is the result of the government’s austerity programme.
However, the wages paid by the new competitors are usually still lower than the
reduced wages of the former monopolists. In Germany and Austria, the wage difference
between the respective former monopolist and new competitors is about 30%, while in
Spain it was 35% until the crisis but since then may have risen to 50% (due to the
competitors use of subs-standard contracts introduced as part of a new labour-market
reform). In the Netherlands, until recently the difference was also 35%, but with the
transformation of self-employed into regular jobs and a new collective agreement they
now come close to the reduced wage levels at the former monopolist, and as such close
to the Dutch minimum wage.
The hourly wages earned by self-employed deliverers in the parcel and express service
industry also tend to be below minimum standards. According to a German case study,
piece rates of between 70 and 90 cents per delivered item amount to an average hourly
wage of 5 euro. As described below, self-employed deliverers in the parcel and express
services partly compensate for low hourly wages by putting in extremely long working
hours.
Working conditions: Liberalisation, together with the introduction of new surveillance
technology, has led to a far-reaching deterioration of working conditions. In a series of
company case studies carried out for the EC funded PIQUE project, very few interview
partners did not mention the increasingly stressful nature of work, caused by an
extension of delivery routes, or by under-staffing in post offices and sorting centres. In
the Austrian case, the length of average delivery routes has almost doubled in the past
15 years. Even managers confirmed that workloads have been increasing, even though,
in their view, working conditions were too lax in the old system. Especially older
workers suffer from the changes. However, they not only complain about increasing
workloads and decreasing autonomy. They also suffer from a loss of positive
identification with their job, as being a post(wo)man increasingly feels like having any
other low-wage service-sector job. Deteriorating working conditions and weakening job
identification have fuelled labour turnover rates.
Working conditions are even worse in the parcel and express service industry: Here
self-employed deliverers not only suffer from permanent work pressure and the need to
cope with unforeseen difficulties but also from long working hours of up to 15 hours per
day.
Industrial relations: The deterioration of postal-sector employment and working
conditions has been underpinned by a fragmentation of industrial relations. With few
exceptions, the former monopolists are covered by a company-based collective
agreement whereas the new competitors operate without collective labour regulations
(other than those imposed by law) or with an agreement offering worse conditions than
those granted by the incumbent. The fragmentation of industrial relations has, in turn,
facilitated the emergence of two-tier labour relations. However, there are important
differences between countries depending on the resilience of the national industrial
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relation system. Furthermore, with the growth of self-employment an increasing
proportion of the postal-sector workforce is formally excluded from trade-union and
works-council representation.
The role of new technology: The introduction of new technology, no doubt, plays a
crucial role in the restructuring of European postal sectors and the transformation of
postal-sector work. Automated mail sorting has reduced the need for workers while the
invention of GPS devices has made it possible to deploy inexperienced employees for
mail delivery. However, technology is not responsible for the massive closure of post
offices and the intensification of postal-sector work. In fact, new technology could also
be used to improve working conditions and reduce workloads. However, there is little
evidence that it is put to this purpose in the liberalised postal sector. Much rather, the
transformation of postal-sector work is the result of a combination of new technology
and the search for cost savings induced by liberalisation and in some cases privatisation
processes.
Introduction
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1. INTRODUCTION
The following report is an update and extension of an earlier study carried out as part of
the European-Commission-funded research project‚ ‘Privatisation of Public Services
and Impacts on Quality, Employment and Productivity’ (PIQUE).1 In this project we
investigated the impact of liberalisation and privatisation of public services on
employment and working conditions as well as on productivity and service quality.
Postal services were among the sectors that were covered by the research. The research
was carried out between 2006 and 2009 and not only included an analysis of regulatory
and market changes but also a series of company case studies for which we conducted
interviews with managers, trade unionists and workers to gain a fuller understanding of
the responses to liberalisation and, in some cases, privatisation. In the postal sector we
conducted eight case studies in five countries, including five former monopolists and
three new competitors. Especially the case studies on new competitors provided us with
important insights of how liberalisation affected employment and working conditions.
One finding of the PIQUE research was that among the four sectors covered by the
research (electricity, local public transport, health care/hospitals, postal services),
postal-sector work was the one that was most severely affected by the changes.
For this report, we have updated four of the initial reports (for Austria, Belgium,
Germany and Poland) and have produced two additional reports in countries that were
not covered by the PIQUE research (Greece and the Netherlands). In addition, we have
also made use of a more recent research project coordinated by FORBA, ‘Social
Dialogue and Participation Strategies in the Global Delivery Industry: Challenging
Precarious Employment Relations’ (SODIPER), which looked at employment
conditions in the parcel and express service sector in four countries (Austria, Czech
Republic, Germany and Hungary).2 Similar to the PIQUE project, it found quite
problematic employment and working conditions in the sector it investigated.
We have also used any other available information, including data sets provided by
Eurostat and the recent WIK report on ‘Main Developments in the Postal Sector (2000-
2013)’, which for the first time included a serious analysis of postal-sector employment.
The report starts with a brief summary of the liberalisation process, followed by an
analysis of company responses and the various business strategies adopted in the
liberalised European postal markets. It then presents an analysis of the changes in
employment numbers. This is followed by an analysis of the consequences of
liberalisation for forms of employment, wages and working conditions. The report ends
with a discussion of the challenges for collective bargaining and brief conclusion.
1 www.pique.at.
2 www.sodiper.forba.at.
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2. THE PROCESS OF LIBERALISATION
The debate about a single European Market for postal services picked up in the late
1980s, resulting in the circulation of the European Commission’s ‘Green Paper on the
Development of the Single Market for Postal Services’ in 1991 (European Commission
1991. Therein the Commission criticised the fragmentation of postal markets in Europe
along national standards and regulations. In the late 1980s, the handling and delivery of
mail (as opposed to heavy parcels and express services) were still organised as national
postal monopolies held by state departments or public enterprises. The Commission
expected the introduction of competition not only to establish similar standards across
Europe, but also to improve service quality and efficiency. The European Council
shared the Commission’s view and the Green Paper resulted in a Council Resolution,
followed by a draft directive in 1995 and the First Postal Directive in 1997 (EC
Directive 97/67/EC). This long discussion process was due to sustained concerns about
the consequences of liberalisation for the public nature of postal services as well as
about the future of the national monopolists. The resulting compromise included a
gradual opening of the market and the introduction of a universal service obligation.
According to the First Postal Directive, member states were required to reduce the
postal monopoly to mail items weighing 350 grams and less or costing less than five
times the basic tariff from 1998 onwards. At the same time, governments had to appoint
one provider – to this day exclusively the former monopolists – to provide a universal
postal service in each member state to ensure that all households have access to postal
services. The scope and quality of the universal service was left to the member states.
Governments typically imposed standards with regard to the density of postal outlets
and letterboxes, the number of delivery days as well as the speed of delivery (Input
Consulting 2006). While the directive did not require member states to privatise postal
operators, it demanded for the creation of financially independent organisations no
longer subsidised by the state.
Following the strategy of a gradual market opening, the Second Postal Directive of 2002
(EC Directive 2002/39/EC) further reduced the reserved (monopoly) area. From 2003
onwards, this was limited to items weighing 100 grams and less or costing less than
three times the basic tariff in 2003 and, from 2006 on, to items weighing 50 grams and
less or costing less than 2.5 times the basic tariff. The second directive also included a
plan for full liberalisation, but the date had to be postponed due to the resistance of
some member states. The Third Postal Directive adopted in 2008 set a new date for full
liberalisation. According to the new plan, all remaining postal monopolies were to be
eliminated by 2011, with 11 member states receiving a two-year extension until
1 January 2013.3 The third directive also responded to mounting criticism of the
3 The 2013 deadline applies to Cyprus, Czech Republic, Greece, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania,
Luxembourg, Malta, Poland, Romania and Slovakia.
The Process of Liberalisation
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employment effects of liberalisation and encouraged member states to take ‘social
considerations into account when preparing the opening up of postal markets’.
Some member states opened their postal markets earlier and to a larger extent than
required by the European regulations and some privatised parts of the former
monopolists. As a result, there are ‘forerunners’ and ‘latecomers’ in the liberalisation
process. Among the forerunners are Finland and Sweden, which fully liberalised postal
markets in 1991 and 1992 respectively but kept their former monopolists in public
ownership. By contrast, the Dutch government early on embarked on a process of
privatisation and from 1994 on admitted private shareholders to the newly created joint
stock company, which then paved the way for the takeover of the international express
service TNT in 1996. Initially, full market opening in the Netherlands was planned for
2007 but had to be postponed to 2009 mainly due to rising concerns about negative
consequences for wages and working conditions (Van Klaveren 2013). Germany is also
among the forerunners since the German government went beyond the EU standards
and in 1998 reduced the reserved area to 200 instead of 350 grams and fully liberalised
the postal market in 2008, ahead of the 2011 deadline. At this stage, the majority of
German Post shares were already in private hands, after the government had started a
divestment process in 2000. The United Kingdom abandoned the remaining parts of its
postal monopoly in 2006 but only recently started to privatise its former monopolist.
The majority of countries followed the schedule of the liberalisation process as laid out
in the European postal directives. However, 11 countries were granted an extension to
2013 instead of 2011, to allow them to lift the remaining barriers for new market
entrants. As a result of the different speeds of market opening in European postal
markets, some countries are still catching up in comparison to the early movers. These
catching-up processes include, for example, ongoing employment cuts at former
monopolists or market consolidation after an initial phase with many competing
providers.
Despite full market opening, competition in the European letter market is still limited.
The former monopolists still dominate the letter markets with markets shares of more
than 95%, and in a number of countries even more than 98%. Only in Germany, the
Netherlands, Sweden, Spain and Italy the new competitors have acquired market shares
of more than 10% (Dieke et al. 2013: 182-3). However, market dominance has not
prevented former monopolists from adopting cost-saving strategies. Furthermore, there
is considerable competition in some sub-segments, such as the distribution of
advertising material, and there is strong competition in the parcel and express service
sector.
In most countries, the parcel and express services never fell under the monopoly
regulation but with the liberalisation of postal markets former monopolists and
international courier services are now competing for market shares. The parcel and
express-service market is particularly interesting because the business is growing,
mainly due to the surge of online shopping. According to Dieke et al. (2013: 163),
parcel and express revenues meanwhile account for more than half of total postal-sector
The Process of Liberalisation
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revenues. While parcel and express volumes are increasing, letter mail is on the
decrease. Here, the Internet can be held responsible: letter mail is increasingly
substituted by emails and other forms of electronic communication. For some former
monopolists, including the Dutch and the Danish Post, the decline in letter volumes is
quite a challenge (ibid.: 163, 169). For others, such as German Post, the situation is less
dramatic because the drop in letter mail is compensated for by the growth in parcel and
express services – which in the Dutch case is no longer possible after the separation
between letter mail and parcel and express services.
Company Responses to Liberalisation
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3. COMPANY RESPONSES TO LIBERALISATION
3.1. Internationalisation and diversification
Faced with potential competition and the likely loss of market shares in the former
monopoly areas, the incumbent postal companies adopted internationalisation and
diversification strategies to maintain or increase revenues (Brandt and Hermann 2012:
58-59). As mentioned before, Dutch Post early on pushed for internationalisation and
already in the 1990s acquired the Australian parcel and express service TNT. Shortly
after 2000, German Post adopted a similar strategy and took over the American parcel
and express service DHL. By now, both TNT and DHL have become global players in
the international parcel and express service industry. With some delay the French and
British ex-monopolists have also created separate express services that are increasingly
active on international markets (Dieke et al. 2013: 234-235).
A number of former monopolists have also expanded into the logistics sector with a
series of new acquisitions. German Post acquired one of the largest German haulage
companies, while the Austrian Post has invested in a specialised haulage company for
thermo-sensitive goods (Hermann 2011: 258). It is important to note in this context that
most former monopolists were diversified companies before the start of the
liberalisation process. As state enterprises, they not only provided mail but also
telephone services and in some countries they also operated post banks. However,
during the liberalisation process most governments split off the different business
segments and transformed them into independent companies, usually to sell off the
more lucrative telephone and bank businesses to private investors. However, some
former monopolists, such as the Italian Post, have held on to their banking business and,
as a result, can now use the revenues from the post banks to support the ailing mail
segment (Dieke et al. 2013: 201 and 204).
In addition to expanding into the international parcel and express service industry,
former monopolists have also internationalised by setting up subsidiaries in foreign mail
markets. German Post, until recently, operated mail subsidiaries in Spain (Unipost) and
the Netherlands (Selekt Mail) while Dutch Post did the same in Germany, the UK, Italy
(all TNT Post) and Austria (Redmail). Even smaller ex-monopolists have expanded into
other countries: after several ownership changes since its foundation in 1991, the
Swedish competitor Bring Citymail is meanwhile owned by the Norwegian Post while
the Austrian Post, through its low-cost subsidiary Feibra, has expanded to Hungary,
Slovakia and a number of other Central and Eastern European countries (Hermann
2011: 258).
However, more recently this trend has partly been reversed. German Post decided in
2010 to leave the Dutch market and in 2011 sold its shares in Selekt Mail to the only
remaining competitor, Sandd. Both Sandd and Dutch Post had repeatedly accused
Selekt Mail for price dumping. The exit of German Post was widely perceived as a
relief as it is expected to end a four-year price war in the Dutch postal market (Van
Company Responses to Liberalisation
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Klaveren 2013). According to trade union sources, German Post is also planning to
withdraw from its Spanish subsidiary Unipost in order to focus on its parcel business.4
The Dutch Post, in turn, has dissolved its own low-cost subsidiary in the Netherlands
and terminated its joint venture with an Austrian publishing company. While these
activities can be seen as part of market consolidation problems, they are also a sign of
the continuous difficulties to establish a profitable competitor in a shrinking market. In
the Netherlands, the withdrawal is also part of market consolidation processes that have
left one major competitor as the main challenger of the former monopolist (Dieke 2013:
205-206).
3.2. Focus on business clients
Apart from internationalisation and diversification, a third major strategy applied by
former monopolists as well as new competitors in liberalised postal markets is the focus
on business clients, including mail-order businesses, insurance companies, banks and
telephone companies, for whom they send monthly bills to their customers. In the UK,
the 50 largest customers are responsible for 40% of the mail volume (Hooper et al.
2008: 25). Given the importance of large customers, management makes every possible
effort to hold on to them, including offering them individual rebates (Hermann 2011:
259). Not surprisingly, Copenhagen Economics (2012: 14) has found that the prices of
single-piece mail have risen significantly faster than those for business mail products.
New competitors in liberalised postal markets have an even stronger focus on business
clients. Large customers produce large amounts of mail that they can either deliver to
local sorting centres, sometimes even pre-sorted, or have it picked up by the postal
service provider. In contrast to the universal service providers, the new competitors
have the additional advantage that picking up the post at the customers’ premises allows
them to avoid establishing a costly network of post offices and letterboxes (Brandt and
Hermann 2012: 60-61). So far, as Dieke et al. (2013: 193) note, only German
competitors have set up a noticeable number of access points and street letterboxes. In
other countries new market entrants exclusively target larger business customers (ibid.).
However, new competitors not only focus their businesses on large customers but also
on highly populated areas. The Austrian competitor, for example, has no intention to
deliver mail to the many remote villages in the Austrian Alps, where it can take several
hours to deliver one letter. Should they have to deliver a letter to such an address, they
would put in a new envelop and send it with the universal service provider (Hermann
2009: 243). In Germany, the Pin Group had established a nationwide delivery network,
but only to go bankrupt soon afterwards. TNT in Germany has now started to abandon
regional offices after claiming it reached 90% of German households. Sandd continues
to maintain a nationwide network in the Netherlands, yet, from an Austrian or Swedish
perspective, the entire Dutch territory counts as a highly populated area (Hermann 2011:
259-260).
4 Interview Montserrat Mir, Confederación Sindical de Comisiones Obreras, 20 November 2013.
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The focus on lucrative business clients and highly populated areas has been criticised as
‘cream skimming’ by the former monopolists, who as universal service providers are
obliged to deliver mail in regions where it is not possible to make a profit. In some
member states, universal service providers are compensated by the government for the
economic burden of maintaining the universal service through tax exemptions and/or
fees paid by the new competitors into a special universal service fund. However, the
same companies who criticise the competitors in their home countries apply the very
same strategies with their own foreign subsidiaries. Furthermore, in several countries
former monopolists have reduced the scope of their universal service obligation by
closing down post offices and reducing the number of public letterboxes (Brandt and
Hermann 2012: 61-62).
3.3. Automation, streamlining and outsourcing
Since liberalisation, former state monopolists have invested large amounts of money in
the modernisation of their infrastructures. New sorting centres were built with fully-
automated sorting processes. While in some countries final sorting (that is, the sorting
of mail for the individual delivery routes) is still done by postal workers in local
distribution centres, in others fully sorted mail is delivered to local depots (Hermann
2011: 260-1). This, as described below, not only has important consequences for the
nature of jobs in the sector, but also for working conditions and employment status.
While sorting has been automated, the distribution networks have been subjected to a
streamlining process in which the number of distribution bases has been reduced.
Together, the automation of sorting centres and the streamlining of distribution
networks helped to increase the speed of delivery and to meet the next-day delivery
targets imposed as part of the universal service obligations (ibid.). However, while the
speed of mail delivery has been increased, former monopolists have cut back their post
office networks. German and Dutch Post no longer operate post offices, while the
Swedish post has closed down all but a few offices (Dieke et al. 2013: 191). Polish Post
has actually increased the number of post offices in recent years, but only in urban
areas. In rural areas, the number of post offices is also decreasing (Kubisa 2013: 6).
The concentration of distribution networks has been complemented by a range of
outsourcing measures (Brandt and Hermann 2012: 61-62). According to the German
postal regulator, German Post deployed a total of more than 1,800 subcontractors in
2005, including taxi drivers who were hired to empty letterboxes and drive the mail to
the next post office (Bundesnetzagentur 2007: 122). In a number of countries, former
monopolists have outsourced the delivery of parcels and express mail to so-called
service partners, which themselves outsource the tasks to self-employed deliverers
(Haidinger 2012).
Another major area of outsourcing is the range of services offered by post offices. As
mentioned before, the German and Dutch Post no longer operate their own postal
outlets. Instead, they contract postal agencies to provide some of the former post-office
services, including posting and pick-up services. The contractors include shops,
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supermarkets, petrol stations and, in Austria, even municipalities that have taken over
the local post office after it was closed down by the former monopolist. In Germany and
Austria, the contractors also include local branches of the former post banks that were
sold off by the ex-monopolists in the course of the liberalisation process (Dieke et al.
191-192).
The restructuring of the distribution networks was complemented by a reorganisation of
the delivery routes. Here, two opposite trends have emerged: While Austrian Post has
extended the length of average delivery routes, in the Netherlands delivery routes were
shortened. The shortening has become possible since final sorting has been relocated
from local offices to regional sorting centres. Instead of sorting mail before starting their
tours, post deliverers pick up the fully sorted mail at a storage near to their delivery
routes (Hermann 2011: 261). As described below, the shortening of delivery routes
allowed for the transformation of full-time jobs into part-time positions.
3.4. Low-tech, low labour costs and flexible structures
While the former monopolists have invested heavily in new and labour-saving
technology, new competitors in the liberalised letter markets typically pursue a low-
tech, low-cost business strategy (Hermann 2011: 261-262). As described below, this
strategy is highly dependent on the use of cheap labour. While the former monopolists
are constrained by the need to utilise their costly infrastructures and to fulfil their
universal service obligations, new competitors are eager to maintain a high level of
flexibility and they do so by keeping fixed costs low.
One way of keeping fixed costs low is to grow through the cooperation with local
providers rather than establishing a country-wide network. The insolvency of a German
competitor has shown that the company was actually made up of almost 90 independent
firms which cooperated under the umbrella of the PIN AG (Brandt and Hermann 2012:
63). The Spanish Unipost, itself a subsidiary of German Post, is pursuing a similar
strategy and is growing by offering franchising agreements to local operators (Comisión
Nacional de la Competencia 2011: 21). Another strategy is to deliver mail only two or
three times a week instead of the five or six times expected from the universal service
provider. This leaves more room for adaptation. The limitation of delivery days is
possible because the mail can be delivered not only in the morning but also in the
afternoon and some of it even at the weekend. In sum, the combination of low fixed
costs and greater flexibility allows the competitors to compete with the former
monopolists despite a much less technologically advanced delivery network (Hermann
2011: 261-262).
In Austria, Germany and the Netherlands, the former monopolists have emulated the
competitors’ advanced flexibility by setting up their own low-cost subsidiaries. The
low-cost subsidiaries consequently allow them to keep competitors at bay. However,
while the German and Dutch ex-monopolists have, in the meantime, terminated their
low-cost subsidiaries as part of market consolidation processes, Austrian Post continues
using its own low-cost provider in order to put pressure on its core workforces to accept
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wage cuts and work intensification. Some former monopolists have also introduced
cheaper mail categories to confront the business model of the new competitors (after
massive investments in automation to reach the next-day delivery target). The Dutch
Post, for example, offers a basic service for business customers that includes longer
delivery times (48 or 72 hours instead of 24 hours) and delivery is restricted to three
days a week (Dieke et al. 2013: 209).
However, despite the low-tech and low-labour costs strategy, many new competitors
still struggle to generate sufficient revenues. According Dieke et al. (2013: 205),
competitors tend to be significantly less profitable than former monopolists in the
respective national letter markets. The insolvency of the German Pin Group has shown
that competitors can expand too extensively and too fast. The recent exits of German
Post from the Dutch letter market and of Dutch Post from the Austrian and other
markets are also an indication of the economic difficulties faced by new competitors on
shrinking letter markets.
3.5. Global delivery chains and local subcontractors
Although not directly affected by the liberalisation process, the parcel and express
service sector also underwent major changes in the past decades and with repercussions
for the entire postal service sector. While in the letter market competition is limited, in
the parcel and express delivery sector it is rather intensive with a number of different
providers fighting for market shares. There are four global providers on the European
markets, two from the United States (UPS and FedEX) and two from Europe (DHL and
TNT). As mentioned before, the two European players are closely linked to the German
and Dutch former monopolists (in the Dutch case until recently). In addition, the French
and British monopolists have created European-wide and a number of other incumbents
regional delivery networks (Dieke et al. 2013: 234). However, these companies are
merely more than the backbone of the industry, providing the IT infrastructure and
transport between different logistics centres (including air transport). Most of the
manual work involved is outsourced to subcontractors and self-employed workers.
Bettina Haidinger (2012: 51-52) identifies four different segments in the global parcel
and express service value chain: First, at the top end of the delivery chain, transnational
corporations including former monopolists. Few of them still employ couriers
themselves. Instead, they award contracts to so-called service partners. The second link
in the chain, these service partners are small or medium-sized firms that in turn directly
negotiate contracts with drivers or subcontractors stipulating the areas, prices, fines,
appearance of vehicles and drivers for delivery and collection. While they are formally
independent actors, they in fact remain heavily dependent on the original service
provider and hardly enter negotiations on an equal footing with transnational
corporations. The third link in the delivery chain is either the self-employed driver, the
employed driver, or, again, a smaller subcontracting entity hiring a few (self-)employed
drivers for the delivery of the parcels.
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Haidinger (ibid.) also notes that the business structures are not only vertically
fragmented but that the working conditions and employment relations found within a
single chain link can also differ substantially: they are different for postal workers and
persons employed by the former incumbent postal service providers; couriers directly
employed by a competing service provider; couriers employed by a subcontractor of the
service provider; and self-employed drivers without employment contracts. As
described below, the last group suffer from particularly poor employment and working
conditions.
Figure 1: Global parcel and express delivery chains
International
Logistics
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MNC
Companies as MNC
International delivery
Self-employed
couriers
Subcontractors
Service Partners
National and regional delivery
Service Provider
National Post
Subsidiaries as
Service Provider
Employed
couriers
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couriers
Companies as national provider
Employed
couriers
Source: Haidinger 2012: 15.
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4. CHANGES IN EMPLOYMENT AND WORKING CONDITIONS
4.1. Employment numbers
The assessment of the impact of liberalisation on European postal sector employment is
not an easy task, for two reasons: First, there is a lack of comparable employment data
in the postal sector and, second, employment changes are typically the result of an
interplay of different forces and it is difficult to discern the effect of liberalisation from
other developments, such as technological innovation.
However, the European Commission was not particularly cautious when it predicted in
2002 that the liberalisation of postal markets (as of other network industries) will result
in net job gains: ‘Market opening will help to expand the overall size of the postal
markets, and any reductions in staff levels among the universal service providers due to
such measures (or their anticipation) are likely to be offset by the resulting growth in
employment among private operators and new market entrants.’ (EC 2002) In their
2010-13 report on ‘Main Developments in the Postal Sector’, Dieke et al. (2013: 255)
note that ‘[o]verall, the letters business … has witnessed a slight reduction in the
number of jobs in the last decade.’ While this is a remarkable change from earlier
assessments, which still assumed an increase in employment, it very likely is still an
underestimation of the drop in employment numbers that has occurred since the start of
the liberalisation process.
The lack of comparable data makes it necessary to use different sources to explore the
employment changes that have taken place since the start of the liberalisation process.
One such source is employment data from former monopolists, published by WIK
Consulting in various reports on postal sector developments (especially 2009 and 2013).
A comparison of the figures for 1998 and 2012 shows a clear picture: Former
monopolists have drastically cut employment since the start of the liberalisation process.
Of 33 companies overall, only three increased job levels, and all three (Ireland, Slovenia
and Luxembourg) are from particularly small countries.5 11 former monopolists cut
employment by between 20 and 29%, 3 by between 30 and 39% and another 3 by 40%
or more. The British former monopolist reduced job numbers by 19% between 2003 and
2012.
5 In Luxembourg, the growth in job numbers may partly be the result of an increase in part-time
employment. Almost 40% of the staff there are employed on part-time contracts (Dieke et al. 266).
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Figure 2: Changes in employment numbers former monopolists 1998-2012
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However, these figures may even underestimate the real extent of changes in job
numbers, as during the same period a number of former monopolists increased the share
of part-time workers as part of the restructuring process (see below).6 In some cases, the
2012 figures may also include new employment created at foreign subsidiaries.7
While former monopolists have cut employment, new market entrants have created new
jobs since the start of liberalisation. However, given the rather small market shares that
have been acquired by the competitors since the start of the liberalisation process, they
can hardly make up for the employment losses incurred at the former monopolists (see
Figure 2 and Table 2). While only two countries have competitors with a total market
share of 20% or above 16 countries have former monopolists with employment losses of
more than 20%.
Dieke et al. (2013: 259) note that in most member states the new market entrants are of
low significance for employment due to a low level of competition. In countries with
substantial competition, however, ‘the share of new entrants in sector employment
corresponds approximately to their market share’ (ibid.). This conclusion only holds if
headcounts are compared. As described below, it is far too optimistic if the changes are
counted in full-time equivalents. However, it is also worth noting that the reverse
conclusion – countries with the deepest employment cuts at former monopolists are
those with the largest amount of competition – does not hold at all. Austrian Post, for
example, enjoys a market share of more than 98% but still eliminated 47% of jobs
between 1999 and 2012. In Greece, Norway and Iceland the former monopolists have a
similar dominant market position and reduced employment by between 31% and 38%.
In Belgium, Denmark and Malta the former monopolists hold on to 95% of the market
share and still cut employment by between 20% and 23% (see Table 1).
6 Employment data for Dutch Post refers to full-time equivalents.
7 Employment data for German Post refers to national employment (excluding employment in
international subsidiaries).
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Table 1: Changes in employment at former monopolists and market shares of new
competitors
Employment
losses at former
monopolists
(1998-2012)
Market shares
of competitors
in letter
markets (2012)
40% and more Austria, Cyprus, Germany 20% Netherlands, Romania
30-39% Greece, Iceland, Norway 10% Germany, Italy, Lithuania, Poland,
Spain, Sweden
20-29% Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic,
Denmark, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta,
Netherlands, Slovakia, Sweden
5% Bulgaria, Estonia, Slovakia,
Slovenia
10-19% Finland, Hungary, Italy, Poland,
Portugal, United Kingdom
2% Austria, Belgium, Cyprus,
Denmark, Finland, France,
Greece, Iceland, Hungary, Malta,
Norway, Portugal, UK
10% and less Spain; Romania
Employment gains
(1998-2012)
Ireland; Luxembourg; Slovenia
Sources: Data from WIK Consulting ‘Reports on Main Developments in the Postal Sector’ and from additional
sources; own calculation and compilation.
Germany is among those countries where new competitors have acquired a significant
market share. However, if counted in full-time equivalents the employment created by
the new market entrants can still not make up for the employment cuts at German Post.
According to data from the German postal regulator, the former monopoly provider has
cut employment in the letter segment by 38,000 workers since 1999 while employment
at the new competitors amounted to 16,308 full-time equivalents in 2011
(Bundesnetzagentur 2013: 112). Even if some of the jobs that were made redundant at
the former monopolist were part-time, which is rather unlikely given that the part-time
rate at German Post has actually increased since 1999, there is still a significant gap
between job losses and job gains in the consolidated German letter market.
In the Netherlands the situation is similar: Between 2002 and 2012, 34,000 near full-
time jobs were lost at the former monopolist, while 22,000 jobs for post deliverers,
mostly working half-time or less, were created by the new competitors (Van Klaveren
2013). In Spain, approximately 4,000 jobs lost at the former monopolist compare to an
equal number of jobs created by the new competitors. But, here too, the majority of the
newly created jobs are part-time.8 In Sweden, on the other hand, the 1,740 full-time
equivalent jobs created by the main competitor by 2012 hardly compensate for the more
than 12,000 jobs eliminated at the former monopolist between 1998 and 2008.
8 Interview Montserrat Mir, Confederación Sindical de Comisiones Obreras, 20 November 2013
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Eurostat Labour Force Survey data does confirm the trend of decreasing employment in
postal and courier activities but the evidence is much more inconclusive. Taken
together, employment in the sector fell by almost 85,000 jobs, or 5%, between 2003 and
2012 in the 18 countries for which data is available.9 However, this overall reduction in
employment has been due to quite diverse national experiences: Thus, in 9 countries
employment in the sector declined, in 8 countries it increased and in one country it
stagnated over the observation period. Furthermore, there is some insecurity as to the
accuracy of the data set since Eurostat changed sector classifications in 2008.10 A
division into sub-periods shows that employment tended to increase between 2003 and
2007 and tended to fall between 2008 and 2012 (see Table 2). Other data published by
Eurostat shows an almost 30% fall in postal-sector employment between 2004 and
2010, but there is reason to believe that this data only covers the universal service
providers (Dieke et al. 2013: 256). However, the 2003-2012 observation period may
actually be too short to account for the full extent of change that has occurred since the
start of the liberalisation process. The PIQUE project analysed postal sector
employment data from national sources for the period between 1995 and 2005 for
Austria, Belgium, Germany and Sweden and found a clear drop in employment numbers
in all four countries (Kozek, Radzka and Hermann 2012: 131).
9 For some countries data was only available for a shorter time periods.
10 From NACE Rev.1 (641) to NACE Rev. 2 (53).
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Table 2: Changes in employment numbers
Austria:
Former monopolist
99-2012: -47%;
LFS: 2003-12: -4%
LFS 2003-7: -3%
LFS 2008-12: -10%
Belgium:
Former monopolist
98-2012: -20%
Bulgaria:
Former monopolist
98-2010: -23%
Cyprus
Former monopolist
98-2012: -50%
Czech Republic
Former monopolist
98-2012: -25%
LFS 2003-12: -3%
LFS 2003-7: -12%
LFS 2008-12: +7%
Denmark
Former monopolist
99-2008: -23%
Estonia
Former monopolist
98-2011: -40%
LFS 2003-12: -53%
LFS 2003-7: -25%
LFS 2008-12: -24%
France
Former monopolist
98-2012: -21%
LFS 2003-12: -30%
LFS 2003-7: -7%
LFS 2008-12: -17%
Finland
Former monopolist
98-2008: -17%
LFS 2003-12: -9%
LFS 2003-7: -4%
LFS 2008-12: -2%
Germany
Former monopolist
98-2012: -44%
LFS: 2003-12: O%
LFS 2003-07: +8%
LFS 2008-12: -4%
Greece
Former monopolist
98-2011: -31%
LFS: 2006-12: -36%
LFS 2008-12: -17%
Hungary
Former monopolist
98-2012: -18%
LFS: 2003-12: 0%
LFS 2003-2007: -2%
LFS 2008-12: +17%
Iceland
Former monopolist
98- 2011: -38%
Ireland
Former monopolist
98-2011: +20%
Italy
Former monopolist
98-2012: -9%
LFS: 2004-12: 0
Latvia
Former monopolist
98-2010: -36%
Lithuania
Former monopolist
98-2011: -28%
LFS 2003-12: -10%
LFS 2003-7: +24%
LFS 2008-12: -4%
Luxembourg
Former monopolist
98-2011: +40%
Malta
Former monopolist
98-2012: -23%;
LFS: 2003-12: 0%
Netherlands
Former monopolist
98-2012: +7%
FTE: 98-12: -29%
Norway
Former monopolist
98-2012: -33%
Poland
Former monopolist
98-2012: -10%
LFS 2004-12: +20%
LFS 2004-07: +16%
LFS 2008-12: -1%
Portugal
Former monopolist
98-2012: -17%
LFS 2004-12 : +9%
LFS 2004-07: +3%
LFS 2008-12 : 0%
Romania
Former monopolist
98-2012: -9%
LFS 2004-12: +36%
LFS 2004-7: +37%;
LFS 2008-12: -2%
Slovakia
Former monopolist
98-2012 -23%
LFS 2003-12: +16%
LFS 2003-07: +11%
LFS 2008-12: -4%
Slovenia
Former monopolist
98-2012: + 12%
Spain
Former monopolist
98-2012: -6%
LFS 2003-12: +16%
LFS 2003-07: +28%
LFS 2008-12: -18%
Sweden
Former monopolist
98-2008: -29%
LFS 2006-12: -2%;
2008-12: -3%
United Kingdom
Former monopolist
2003-12: -19%
LFS 2009-12: -7%
Sources: Data from WIK Consulting ‘Reports on Main Developments in the Postal Sector’ and from Eurostat
Labour Force Survey; own calculation and compilation.
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To which extent employment losses can be ascribed to liberalisation or other
developments, such as technological innovation and decreasing mail volumes, is
difficult to assess. However, from the PIQUE company case studies we know that
competition and the pressure to increase profits played an important role in the
restructuring processes at the former monopolists (Brandt and Hermann 2012).
New technology as such does not require postal companies to close down post offices
and to outsource the related services to subcontractors, to the effect that some postal
service providers no longer operate their own post office networks. In Austria, for
example, employment in the post office network was reduced by 8,000 full-time
equivalent jobs between 2002 and 2010 following the closure of 739 post offices during
the same period (Rechnungshof 2011: 148). New technology is also not responsible for
the reorganisation of delivery routes and the transformation of full-time into part-time
jobs, even though new technology made these changes possible. Rather it is a
combination of the availability of new technology and liberalisation-induced pressures
to cut costs that led postal managers to make these decisions.
Furthermore, technological advancement not only helps companies to make do with less
staff but could also be used to reduce work strains. Yet, the case studies carried out for
the PIQUE project provide overwhelming evidence that work in postal services has
become more intense and exhausting as a result of the changes introduced since the start
of the liberalisation process – an observation that was not even disputed by management
(Brandt and Hermann 2012: 70). In other words, even though liberalisation may not be
the main cause of employment cuts, the pressures unleashed by the opening-up of postal
markets certainly facilitated technological and organisational change, which allowed
postal companies to pare down jobs, and consequently cut employment.
In some countries decreasing mail volumes also present a major challenge for former
monopolists and for the maintenance of existing staff levels. In the Netherlands, for
example, the mail volume declined by 26.5% between 2005 and 2012 (Van Klaveren
2013). However, liberalisation has further aggravated the problem as the loss of market
shares to new market entrants has created additional stress for the former monopolist,
who is dependent on high mail volumes to utilise its technologically advanced country-
wide delivery network. Because of decreasing mail volumes and a loss of market shares,
the former Dutch monopolist struggles with a 33% drop in letter post since 2005 (Van
Klaveren 2013).
To some extent, decreasing mail volumes have been compensated for by increasing
volumes in parcels and express services (causing some former monopolists to re-merge
letter and parcel delivery after it had been separated in an earlier phase of the
restructuring process). However, in the Netherlands the former monopolist can no
longer profit from an expansion of the express services as in 2011 the mostly private
shareholders succeeded to split the company into a Netherlands-only postal company
and an internationally operating express service firm. The Dutch post has now only a
minority share in TNT Express, the newly created company (Van Klaveren 2013).
Hence the problems of the postal part of the former Dutch monopolist are not only the
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result of falling mail volumes, but also of privatisation and the prevalence of private
profit interests.
Other countries struggle with the effects of the financial crisis and its consequences. In
Greece, for example, postal market revenues decreased by 26% between 2008 and 2012,
employment declined by 25% at the former monopolist and by 17% in the entire postal
sector. Greek GDP fell by 27% over the same period (Gavroglou 2013). Contrary to the
trend in other countries, revenues from courier services also decreased during the crisis,
even though to a lesser extent than in the universal service (ibid.).
4.2. Forms of employment
While the effect of liberalisation on employment is disputable, the consequences for
employment conditions are rather clear. As evidence found in the PIQUE project has
shown, liberalisation of the European postal sectors has resulted in an increase of
atypical and, in part, precarious forms of employment (Brand and Hermann 2012: 65-
66). This finding is largely confirmed by Dieke et al. (2013: 265), who, however, phrase
it differently when they note that they have found increasing flexibility in employment
contracts. The main forms of flexible employment used in the liberalised postal sectors
are part-time contracts, temporary work and self-employment. While most companies
have increased atypical employment, the specific types of contracts differ from country
to country, between former monopolists and new competitors, as well as between
different segments of the postal service sector.
Most former monopolists have increased the number of part-time workers since the start
of the liberalisation process. However, the extent of part-time work differs considerably
between countries. Some former monopolists have radically changed employment
patterns and now mainly operate with part-time staff. The most radical example is the
Dutch Post, where, meanwhile, nearly 80% of the workforce are employed on part-time
contracts (Dieke et al. 2013: 266). In Cyprus and Lithuania, nearly 60% of the workers
employed by the former monopolists work part-time and in Latvia and Luxembourg
about 40%. In most of the other countries, the part-time rate is close or slightly above
20%, meaning that it is more or less the same as for the rest of the economy (ibid.).
However, a part-time rate of 20% is still remarkable given that many former
monopolists started from a comparably low level. Austrian Post, for example, almost
doubled the part-time rate between 1998 and 2012 (Hermann 2009: 244-245).
The increase in part-time employment is closely linked to the reorganisation of the
delivery network. As described before, some former monopolists have systematically
shortened the delivery routes. As a result, near alls part-time deliverers in the
Netherlands work less than 20 hours a week (Van Klaveren 2013). As described below,
the shift from full-time to part-time deliverers was accompanied by a re-definition of the
deliverer job and significant wage losses. German Post has also reduced delivery routes
and increased the proportion of part-time jobs in the urban areas but continued to
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operate with full-time deliverers in the countryside (not least because deliverers in rural
areas carry parcels as well as letters).11 The Belgian Post also briefly experimented with
the Dutch system of part-time deliverers in 2008 but had to abandon the plan after
massive trade union protests (Vermandere and Van Gyes 2013). While some former
monopolists have shortened delivery routes and use part-time staff, the Austrian and,
more recently, the Belgian Post have extended the delivery routes of their full-time
deliverers. In the Austrian case, the new delivery routes are up to twice as long as before
liberalisation (Hermann 2009: 245; Vermandere and Van Gyes 2013).
Part-time work is even more widespread at the new competitors. The use of part-time
staff is part of their flexible low-cost strategy with which new market entrants try to
challenge the market dominance of the former monopolists (see above). According to
2006 figures from the German postal regulator, the part-time rate at German Post was
37.6% compared to 82.1% at the new competitors (Bundesnetzagentur 2007: 40-41).
However, new market entrants not only rely on part-time contracts, they frequently use
what in Germany is called ‘mini jobs’. Mini jobs are a form of very short part-time,
amounting to an income of less than 400 euro a month. From an employer perspective,
these jobs are particular attractive because they do not require social security
contributions. In 2006, 58% of jobs created by the new market entrants in Germany
were mini jobs, compared to 3.8% at the former monopolist (ibid.). The Spanish
competitors, too, operate mainly with part-time deliverers.12 However, since the crisis
they have also increasingly resorted to using a new form of labour contract that allows
them to pay rates below minimum wages (Hermann 2013: 9).
Table 3: Employees in the German letter market (annual average 2006)
German Post Competitors Total
Full-time 92,413 62.4 % 8,618 17.9% 101,031 51.5 %
Part-time 50,116 33.8% 11,625 24.1% 61,741 31.5 %
Mini jobs 5,566 3.8 % 27,928 58.0% 33,494 17.0 %
In total 148,095 100% 48,171 100% 196,266 100%
Source: Bundesnetzagentur; published in Brandt and Hermann 2012.
While German competitors in the letter market mainly operate with mini jobs, new
market entrants in other countries use self-employed deliverers. In these cases,
deliverers lack the basic employment rights and social security coverage that comes
with a regular employment contract. Until recently, most deliverers employed by the
new competitors in the Netherlands were self-employed, and if they worked only for
one company they rarely put in more than 8 hours per week (Van Klaveren 2013). They
11 Interview Stephan Teuscher, ver.di, 5 July 2013.
12 Interview Montserrat Mir, Confederación Sindical de Comisiones Obreras, 20 November 2013.
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signed a so-called assignment agreement with their employer (overeenkomst van
opdracht) and were paid according to a piece-rate system. After the trade unions had
documented the low earnings of self-employed mail deliverers in the Dutch postal
market, the government adopted legislation requiring the new competitors to limit the
share of self-employed staff to 20% (ibid.). In Poland and Austria, the new competitors
also operate with self-employed mail deliverers. However, while in Poland the
proportion of self-employed workers is somewhat higher than 50%, in Austria it is even
more than 90% (Kubisa 2013; Hermann 2009: 246-247).
Table 4: Employment at the new competitors in Poland (2012)
Number Percentage
Regular employment contracts 12,228 38
Self-employment and others 17,629 54
Agency workers 2,687 8
Source: Data collected by the Polish Office of Electronic Communication; published in Kubisa 2013.
Self-employment is particularly widespread in parcel delivery. As described above, the
sector has underwent far-reaching changes in the past ten years. Following the example
of UPS and Fedex which mainly use subcontractors and self-employed deliverers in
Europe, European providers also started to outsource services. In the Netherlands, for
example, 85% of the parcels sent through Dutch Post in 2010 were actually delivered by
subcontractors, mainly using self-employed deliverers (Van Klaveren 2013). The self-
employed deliverers not only suffer from comparably low hourly wages but also from
long working hours. As Jörg Flecker, Bettina Haidinger and Annika Schönauer (2013:
15) note, for self-employed deliverers the working day “lasts from the first to the last
parcel”. This, in practice, means “long working days of 10 to 15 hours, irrespective of
regulations on working time, resting time, overtime and benefits”. Furthermore, as self-
employed workers they “often bear the additional burdens and risks related to business
fluctuation, vehicle maintenance and business administration” (ibid.).
In Greece, too, the working conditions and labour relations in the core companies are
under the increasing pressure from subcontractors and self-employed deliverer
(Gavroglou 2013). According to 2012 figures, Greek postal companies deployed 1,580
micro companies or contractors in parcel and express mail delivery. These so-called
network associates accounted for approximately 10% of the workforce of the former
monopolist and 60% of the staff of licensed courier services. This trend continued
during the crisis. Hence, while Greek courier services dismissed 786 regular employees
between 2011 and 2012, their affiliated networks hired 329 self-employed workers.
‘This type of outsourcing of postal activities from companies with established systems
of industrial relations and regulated working conditions to independent contractors or
agents with completely unregulated (and even… illegal) industrial relations and
working conditions, is not utilized only by courier companies or private companies, but
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extends to the former public monopolist. It is a process that is eroding the very
foundations of labour regulation’ (ibid.).
In some countries liberalisation have also resulted in an increase in temporary
employment (Dieke et al. 2013: 267). Malta stands out, as here 32% of the workforce at
the former monopolist are employed on a temporary basis. While Malta is an outlier, in
Estonia the proportion is still 21%, in Greece 18%, in Poland and Ireland 14%, in the
Czech Republic 13%, in Finland 12% and in Portugal 9%. In other countries for which
data is available, the proportion of temporary workers is close to 5% (ibid.). The
Belgian Post also used to have high levels of temporary staff, mainly to cover peak
periods in its sorting centres but since 2009 has reduced the proportion to less than 1%
(Vermandere and Van Gyes 2013). By contrast, the Polish Post mainly uses temporary
contracts for newly hired workers. After a one-year ‘trial’ period on a temporary
contract, the new employees are usually offered a permanent position (Kozek 2008).
In addition to the rise in atypical forms of employment, the postal sectors have also seen
a decline in the number of postal workers with civil servant status. With the
transformation of state enterprises into public limited companies, new workers were no
longer hired as civil servants. As a result, civil servants have gradually been replaced by
employees with private sector contracts and significantly less job security. An exception
from this trend is Cyprus, where all workers at the former postal monopolist still enjoy
civil servant status. In Belgium, civil servants make up for 59% and in France and
Luxemburg for 50% of the former monopolist workforce. In Spain, the proportion is
41%, in Austria 40% and in Ireland 19%, whereas in the Czech Republic it has
decreased to 10% and in Germany to 9% (Dieke et al. 2013). Because civil servants
cannot be laid off except for special circumstances, former monopolists have widely
used voluntary schemes, such as early retirement programmes and golden handshakes,
to reduce employment (Brandt and Hermann 2012: 69).
Polish Post, for example, plans to cut employment by 12,000 persons by 2015. Workers
who are leaving voluntarily are offered between 2 and 8 months of salary (Kubisa 2013:
15). While older workers are offered incentives to leave Polish Post, the company is
hiring new staff, preferably aged between 30 and 40, with management skills and
experience in private logistics companies (ibid.). The Austrian Post had a similar
redundancy programme in the 1990s. In 1998, almost 2,000 employees opted for early
retirement, while more than 300 took a golden handshake. In the latter case, it was
predominately young and highly skilled workers who hoped for a second career in the
then booming New Economy (Hermann 2011: 244). In addition, employees who did not
leave voluntarily but were no longer needed were shifted into a special department
where they had to show up every day for work without being given any work to do. The
works council suspects that management hoped that some workers would rather quit
than sit there and wait for retirement (ibid.).
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4.3. Wages
Employment conditions also deteriorated with regard to the wages paid in the postal
sector. As described above, the new competitors have usually adopted a flexible low-
cost strategy. In this strategy, labour costs play a key role. Many competitors pay
considerably lower wages than those offered by the former monopolist. This gave the
former monopolists an argument to reduce the wages of its workforces. German post cut
wages for newly hired workers by 30% in 2001; at Austrian Post employees receive
25% less pay if they were hired after 2008 (Brandt und Hermann 2012: 67-68). While
the German trade union received an employment guarantee in exchange for the wage
cut, i.e. management agreed to refrain from forced layoffs until 2005, in Austrian Post,
the management in turn abandoned its plans to outsource parts of the delivery activities
to its own low-cost subsidiary, which mainly operates with self-employed deliverers
(ibid.).
In the Netherlands and in Belgium, wage cuts at the former monopolists were linked to
the creation of a new job category, auxiliary or assistant deliverers (who are no longer
expected to sort mail but to only deliver it with the help of GPS devices). In the Dutch
case, these new postbestellers earn (per hour) about 40% less than the former postbodes,
in Belgium the difference amounts to 5% (Van Klaveren 2013; Vermandere and Van
Guys 2013). Since 2007, all newly hired deliverers at Dutch Post have been employed
as postbestellers, to the effect that in 2012 80% of the delivery staff received the lower
wage rate (Van Klaveren 2013). In Greece, workers at the former monopolist also had
to take a 35% wage cut in 2009 as part of the country-wide austerity measures.
However, here too, critics argued that the wages of postal sector workers were too high
and needed to be adjusted to the salaries of private sector firms (Gavroglou 2013).
Table 5: Wage cuts at former monopolists
Austria Belgium Germany Greece Netherlands
-25% for newly hired
workers (since
2009)
-5% for auxiliary
deliverers (since
2012)
-30% for newly hired
workers (since 2001)
-35% for all
employees (since
2009)
-40% for auxiliary
deliverers (since
2007)
Source: own compilation from various reports.
Some have argued that wage cuts at former monopolists are little more than an
elimination of public sector wage premiums and an adjustment to market-based incomes
(Copenhagen Economics 2010: 12-13). While it is debatable if this assumption is a
sufficient justification for wage reductions, there is evidence that average postal sector
wages are actually lower than average national or sector-wide wages. According to
Dieke et al. (2013: 268), average wages at former monopolists are between 20 and 30%
lower than national average wages. And with the exception of Poland and Slovenia,
former postal monopolists also pay lower average wages than the wider transport and
storage sector. Part of the wage gap can be explained by skill differences. Postal
services are a sector with comparably low skill levels. However, these differences are
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likely to increase in the years to come as workers on old wage schemes retire and are
replaced by new staff with significantly lower salaries (ibid.).
While regular workers were confronted with wage cuts, management profited from
higher wages and additional benefits, such as stock options. In Poland, a newspaper
revealed that the newly appointed board at Polish Post are paid more than twenty times
the average national wage with the approval of the government in spite of a public
sector wage cap that limits maximum salaries to six times the average national wage.
According to trade union sources, the board members also negotiated a ‘golden
parachute’, which grants them 24 months of salary in the case that their contracts are
terminated (Kubisa 2013).
Table 6: Average wages at former monopolists compared to other wages (2012)
Country Average wage
former
monopolist,
in euro
Average wage
industry and
service,
in euro
Average wage
transportation
and storage,
in euro
Former
monopolist
wage as % of
industry and
service
Former
monopolist
wage as % of
transportation
and storage
CZ 856 951 90
EE 540 832 65
FR 2,279 2,905 78
HU 673 822 82
IE 3,000 3,842 3,360 78 89
IT 2,233 2,309 97
LT 411 714 58
NL 2,700 3,816 3,453 71 78
PL 761 739 103
RO 384 489 512 78 75
SI 1,530 1,460 105
SK 638 899 796 71 80
NO 4,501 4,758 95
Source: Dieke et al. 2013: 268.
Despite the wage cuts, there are still significant wage differences between the former
monopolists and the new competitors. In Germany and Austria, there still is a 30% gap
between the lowest wages paid by the former monopolist and the wages paid by the new
competitors. In Spain, the gap was about 35% before the outbreak of the crisis but may
have increased to as much as 50% since the introduction of a major labour market
reform that allows the new competitors to pay below minimum wages.13 Before the
adoption of a new collective agreement, the difference in the Dutch mail market
13 Interview Montserrat Mir, Confederación Sindical de Comisiones Obreras, 20 November 2013.
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accounted for almost 40%. However, the comparison of wages still underestimates the
difference in labour costs as employees at former monopolists usually have shorter
working hours, longer vacations and special leave arrangements, collectively agreed
wage increases and additional benefits.
Table 7: Wage differentials between former monopolists and new competitors
Hourly wage former
monopolist – old regulation
(lowest level, in euro)
Hourly wage former
monopolist – new regulation
(lowest level, in euro)
Hourly wage new
competitors
(average, in euro)
Germany 16.78 11.60 7.60-8.30
Netherlands 13.05 9.00 ~ 6* (8.60)
Austria 10.85 8.68 ~ 7*
*Average salary based on piece rates.
Source: Hermann 2011 updated.
Self-employed deliverers are paid by piece rate and in many cases the resulting hourly
wages are below national or sectoral minimum wages. As described above, the low pay
and poor working conditions of the self-employed deliverers in the Netherlands led to a
public outcry, followed by a government initiative to regulate working conditions. As a
result, the government forced the main competitor to transform 80% of the jobs into
regular employment relations. With a regular employment relation, the post deliverers
fall under the new collective agreement which in 2013 granted its delivery staff a 40%
wage increase (Van Klaveren 2013). The new wage rate will be close to what the former
monopolist pays its auxiliary deliverers. Employees at Dutch Post still enjoy a number
of additional benefits, such as, for example, payments into a company pension fund but
in general the liberalisation of the Dutch postal market has led to a convergence of
postal sector wages to the national minimum wage (ibid.).
In Germany, by contrast, an attempt to introduce a sector-wide minimum wage failed in
2008. The service workers’ union, ver.di, had concluded an agreement with German
Post, which was then extended by the government to cover the entire sector. The
agreement established a minimum rate of 8 euro per hour in East Germany and 9.80
euro in West Germany. At the time, competitors were still paying between 5 and 6 euro
per hour and the former monopolist between 11.43 and 16.78 euro (Hermann 2009:
266). However, the new competitors have challenged the minimum wage at the
administrative court, which subsequently suspended the measure (ibid.).
Self-employed deliverers in German parcel services are also far from earning a
minimum wage. According to a study by Hajo Holst and Ingo Singe (2011: 60), piece
rates of between 70 and 90 cent per delivered item amount to an average hourly wage of
5 euro. These workers can only survive by working 15-hour working days. However,
the authors note that “self-employed couriers are walking a tight rope. Any unforeseen
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incident, such as a downturn in volume, illness, care responsibilities, accidents, or the
need for investment in new material, i.e. cars, can push couriers into bankruptcy. Quite
often, self-employed couriers only become aware of their precarious situation with some
delay, i.e. when tax and insurance are suddenly due” (ibid.: 60).
4.4. Working conditions
Employment cuts, electronic surveillance and the promotion of piece-rate based wages
or wage components have resulted in a widespread intensification of postal sector work.
In the PIQUE case studies, very few interview partners did not mention the increasingly
stressful nature of work, caused by an extension of delivery routes, or by under-staffing
in post offices and sorting centres. Even managers confirmed that workloads have been
increasing, even though, in their view, working conditions were too lax in the old
system (Brandt and Hermann 2012: 70; Hermann 2009: 246).
Furthermore, the widespread elimination of staff reserves – based on the permanent
monitoring and analysis of mail volumes – leads, in e.g. the case of sick leaves, to
additional work for the remaining staff members, who are already struggling to cope
with their workloads (Hermann 2009: 245-246). According to an Austrian trade union
representative, the combination of wage cuts and deteriorating working conditions has
made the job increasingly unattractive and has already led to problems in finding new
workers.14 In some countries, the automation of final sorting, previously done by
deliverers for their individual routes, has made the job more physically strenuous
(Brandt and Hermann 2012: 69).
Especially older workers, who knew the system before liberalisation, experience the
changes as a major deterioration of working and living conditions. They not only
complain about increasing workloads and decreasing autonomy; they also suffer from a
loss of positive identification with their job (Tschnernitz, forthcoming). For many
post(wo)men, the contact with local residents used to be an important part of the job.
They not only delivered the mail but helped older people with small errands or talked to
them about their problems. It was these extra services that made sure that post(wo)men
were held in high esteem by local populations. The positive reputation, in turn, was an
important element in the professional identity of many post(wo)men. With liberalisation
and work intensification, there is no longer time for contact with residents and without
the contact little is left that is enjoyable about the job. Similar changes took place within
post offices. Through work intensification there is little time left to talk to customers
and advise them on different options. The task is to limit the conservation to what is
absolutely necessary. As an Austrian postal deliverer notes in an interview with a
researcher, ‘all that counts is that the company makes money’. And a post office worker
adds, ‘we are all numbers… we’re only here to sell’ (ibid.).
However, working conditions at new competitors can still be significantly worse. Here
deliverers are partly self-employed and paid by piece rates. Hence the more mail they
14 Interview Martin Palensky, works council representative, Austrian Post, 11 July 2013.
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deliver, the higher their wages. As one deliverer noted in an interview for the SODIPER
research project: “We are all working 10.45 hours, eleven or twelve hours… These guys
are completely insane. And there’s the crack, no one aborts delivery, the pressure is just
too much. Everybody is just trying to keep up” ( quoted in Holst and Singe 2011: 64).
The resulting stress levels are aggravated by a lack of social security and the lack of
income in case of illness (ibid.: 70). Based on a series of case studies in four countries,
Haidinger (2012: 53) states that ‘[h]igh work intensity has been described as a pressing
issue everywhere, irrespective of employment/contract status.’ As a result, ‘[w]ork
overload, physical and psychic stress are the little surprising consequences of this
demanding and multifaceted work’ (ibid.).
4.5. Collective bargaining
The differences in wages and working conditions are the result of a lack of sector-wide
regulations and the existence of two-tier labour relations regimes (Schulten and Brandt
2012: 140). The former monopoly providers typically have company-level collective
agreements, which before liberalisation were, at the same time, also sector-wide
agreements. However, as company agreements they did not cover the new competitors
that emerged on the liberalised postal markets. As a result, only in 7 out of 21 EU
member states on which data is available the market entrants are covered by a collective
agreement (Dieke et al. 2013: 274).15 In Germany, one competitor has negotiated a
company agreement with a small employer-friendly trade union, with wages that are
significantly below the proposed postal-sector minimum wage. The agreement is
strongly contested by ver.di, the largest trade union in the sector and the second-largest
union in Germany.
Sweden is one of the few exceptions where the existence of strong collective regulations
prevented a race to the bottom (Brandt and Hermann 2012: 66-67; Schulten and Brandt
2012: 143-144). Even though Sweden was one of the first countries in Europe to
abandon its postal monopoly, Swedish trade unions quickly started to organise the
workers at the new competitor and reached a collective agreement in the company’s
second year of operation. Furthermore, the collective agreements at the former
monopolist and the new market entrant are negotiated by the same trade union and
employer organisation. The result was an upward adjustment process, with working
conditions at the new competitor gradually improved to reach the standards of those at
the former monopolist (Copenhagen Economics 2010: 12).
In the Netherlands the trade unions recently also reached an agreement that increases
the wages at the main competitor to approximately the level paid for newly hired
workers at the former monopolist. However, in the Dutch case the outcome was not an
extension of the conditions in place at Dutch Post before the start of the liberalisation
process. Instead the convergence of employment conditions in the Dutch postal market
has involved an upward adjustment at the new competitors and a downward adjustment
15 CY, ES, FI, NL, SE, SI and NO.
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at the former monopolist. In the first case, wages were increased by 40%, while in the
second case they declined by 40%. The result is a convergence of postal sector wages to
the national minimum wage (Van Klaveren 2013). The difference, perhaps, is that in
Sweden sector-wide labour regulations shaped the liberalisation process, whereas in the
Netherlands the liberalisation process shaped the new labour regulations.
However, the problem is not only the difference between former monopolists and new
competitors, but also the increasingly diffuse boundaries of the postal sector. With the
expansion of parcels and express services, transport sector companies have also become
active in the distribution of postal items. In Belgium, parcel and express services are
covered by the Joint Committee Transport, while the former monopolist is covered by
the company based Joint Committee Bpost (Vermandere and Van Guys 2013). In
Austria the situation is even more confusing. Here workers in the parcel and express
mail sector are covered by six different collective agreements, with different
employment and working conditions. Even Austrian Post’s own subsidiary is covered
by a different agreement than the parent company (Haidinger and Hermann 2008). In
other countries the situation is even worse: In 13 out of 21 countries for which
information is available subsidiaries of former monopolists operate without a collective
agreement (Dieke et al. 2013: 275). Hence with few exceptions, liberalisation has
resulted in a complex fragmentation of postal sector employment conditions. This
fragmentation has facilitated the downward pressure on wages and working conditions
at former monopolists and makes the improvement of the situation at the new
competitors extremely difficult (Brand and Hermann 2012: 66-68; Schulten and Brandt
2012: 143-144).
Table 8: Collective bargaining in the postal sector (letter market)
Austria Belgium Germany Poland Sweden UK
Former
monopolist
Company
agreement
Company
agreement
Company
agreement
Company
agreement
Company
agreement
Company
agreement
New
competitors
Various
sectoral and
company
agreements.
No bargaining
for self-
employed
deliverers
Agreement
for parcel
delivery
One
contested
agreement,
other
agreements
are being
negotiated
No
agreements
Company
agreement
No
agreements
Source: Schulten and Brandt 2012; updated.
The growing fragmentation of postal sector bargaining systems is underpinned by
considerable differences in trade union membership and, consequently, in bargaining
power (Brandt and Hermann 2012: 68). Even though trade union membership at the
former monopolists has often seen a decrease since the start of the liberalisation
process, it is still considerably higher than the national average (except for France) and
much higher than at the new competitors, which often lack any trade union
representation. In 8 out of 23 countries for which data is available 80% or more of the
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workforce at the former monopolists are unionised and in 6 countries the proportion is
between 60 and 79% (Dieke et al. 2013: 281). At the new competitors unionisation rates
are usually considerably lower. In Austria, for example, the unionisation rate among
new competitors’ regular staff is less than 10%. If the self-employed workers are taken
into account, it is minuscule (Brandt and Hermann: 68; Hermann 2009: 249).
Part of the problem is that workers at new competitors often work part-time, many only
for a few hours per week, or they are self-employed. They see their job as a temporary
commitment or as an additional source of income as students, housewives or pensioners.
As a result, they are reluctant to struggle for long-term improvements, which they may
not benefit from or which may not be relevant for their personal living conditions
(Hermann 2011: 264). Trade unions, therefore, have had a hard time to organise
workers at the new work sites and, despite some successes, have mostly failed to
overcome the divide between former monopolists and new competitors (Hermann,
Kubisa and Schulten 2012: 154-155). A notable exception is Sweden, where more than
50% of the mostly young workers at the main competitor have joined the trade union. It
is not by chance that in Sweden employment and working conditions have remained
comparably stable since liberalisation, whereas in many other countries competition led
to a significant deterioration of postal sector labour standards and to the emergence of
two-tier or three-tier labour relations systems (Brandt and Hermann 2012: 68).
Conclusions
Research Report _________________________________________________________________________ 34
CONCLUSIONS
Supporters of the liberalisation of European postal markets, including the European
Commission, have promised better services at lower prices and the creation of more
employment. Fourteen years after the start of the liberalisation process the outcome of
liberalisation and, in some countries, privatisation is rather sobering. Prices may have
gone down for large customers who can negotiate individual rebates, but not necessarily
for regular users who pay according to standard tariffs. Quality increased in some
respects, including the shortening of delivery times for mail sent with the former
monopolists, but deteriorated in others, such as longer waiting times at post offices.
Furthermore, liberalisation also resulted in the establishment of a series of new
competitors who mainly focus on lucrative clients and highly populated areas while
pursuing a low-cost, low-quality business strategy. Interestingly, it is often the former
monopolists complaining about the low-cost competition in their own countries who
apply the same strategy with their foreign subsidiaries.
However, despite the low-cost strategy, it has proven rather difficult for the new
competitors to establish a profit-making business in a shrinking mail market (only in a
few countries, the competitors in the mail market have acquired a significant market
share). For the former monopolists, the new competitors further aggravate the problem
of decreasing mail volumes, which renders their highly automated infrastructures
increasingly unprofitable. While letter volumes are decreasing, the parcel and express
service business is booming. However, here the former monopolists are competing with
global companies who have outsourced large parts of the delivery activities to
subcontractors and self-employed deliverers.
While the general outcome of the liberalisation process is debatable, from the workers’
point of view the changes are rather disastrous. Investments in new technology and the
pressure to reduce labour costs have caused the former monopolists to drastically cut
back employment numbers. It is true that the new market entrants have created new jobs
but, counted as full-time equivalents, these jobs cannot compensate for the job losses
incurred at the former monopolists. Hence, the European Commission was wrong to
predict that liberalisation will create more jobs than those existing under monopoly
conditions.
However, what is even more important is that regular full-time jobs have increasingly
been replaced by atypical employment relations that not only provide less employment
security, but also pay significantly lower wages. In connection with their low-cost
strategy, new competitors either employ workers on short part-time contracts or as self-
employed deliverers. The latter are not only paid by piece rates, but also lack basic
employment and social security. In both cases the income is clearly not enough to cover
minimum living expenses. Competition and the pursuit of higher profits have also
encouraged the former monopolists to cut wages for newly hired workers or workers
employed as assistant mail deliverers. In the parcel and express service industry the
situation is even worse: Here the former monopolists and the global express service
providers increasingly rely on subcontractors and on self-employed deliverers who are
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paid sub-standard hourly wages. Yet while self-employed deliverers in the mail segment
typically work for between 8 and 12 hours per week, self-employed parcel deliverers
work up to 15 hours per day.
In sum, liberalisation has profoundly changed what used to be a reservoir of stable and
decent-paying jobs for low-skilled workers. Increasing parts of the postal sector are
becoming low-wage segments that barely pay more than the national minimum wage. In
the case of self-employed workers, wages often do not even reach the minimum.
However, postal sector jobs have not only become increasingly precarious; they are also
increasingly intense. Reduced staff numbers, together with the application of new
control and planning measures, have meant that individual workloads have risen in
recent years. Working conditions are particularly strenuous for the self-employed
deliverers of parcels and express mail. Paid by per delivered item, they are under
permanent stress to finish their routes while struggling with traffic congestions and
other unexpected problems. However, post(wo)men not only complain about increasing
workloads; they also complain about a more profound change in the nature of their job.
Whereas previously the job involved extensive customer contact, especially with
residents who usually knew their local post(wo)men, now workers are expected to limit
contact to what is absolutely necessary – in the Polish case deliverers who were paid
bonuses according to delivered items even avoided contact by leaving parcel delivery
notes in the mailboxes rather than checking if somebody was at home.
Deteriorating employment and working conditions, as well as the replacement of civil
servants with workers with private sector employment status, has made the job less
attractive and increased staff turnover. In the case of the new competitors, the workers
are likely to stay on for little more than a few months until they find a better job. For
many workers, delivering mail also is just an additional source of income, to pay for
student expenses or to improve their pensions or family income. The decreasing
identification with the job has made it difficult for union organisers to convince workers
at the new competitors to join a trade union.
To some extent, the changes are also a result of the introduction of new technologies.
Automated mail sorting has reduced the need for workers while the automation of final
sorting and the invention of GPS devices has made it possible to significantly shorten
delivery routes and to deploy inexperienced workers. However, technology is hardly the
sole cause of the changes in the sector. Much rather, it is a combination of new
technology and the search for cost savings that has resulted in continuous job cuts,
dequalification and tighter monitoring. Even though technology could also be used to
improve working conditions and reduce workloads, there is little evidence that it is put
to this purpose in the liberalised postal sector.
The growing fragmentation of postal-sector employment relations is underpinned by
similar divisions in the collective bargaining systems. Usually the former monopolists
are covered by a company agreement whereas the new competitors mostly operate
without collective labour standards (other than those imposed by law). In the few cases
where they are covered by an agreement the employment standards are typically lower
than those provided at the former monopolists. There are only a few cases where labour
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regulations have prevented the emergence of two-tier labour relations systems. In
Sweden, the fact that the new competitor adopted a collective agreement similar to that
in place at the former monopolist has taken wages out of competition and prevented a
race to the bottom. In the Netherlands, the former monopolist and the new competitor
also have similar wage levels for newly hired workers. However, in the Dutch case the
common wage floor was the result of the liberalisation process rather than a condition
under which competition could develop (as in the Swedish case). Competition created
massive pressure for the wages at the former monopolist, while a public campaign and
government intervention forced the new competitors to transform self-employed worker
into regular employees and increase their salaries. As a result, wages in the Dutch postal
sector converged to the national minimum wage, whereas in Sweden postal sector wage
levels were largely upheld during the liberalisation process.
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